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Caspian Energy Prospects 
Paul A. Williams and Ali Tekin
Many have linked the US-led invasion of Iraq to its oil resources, leading some 
observers to question Caspian energy prospects. This article analyzes how the 
Iraqi occupation and Caspian oil prospects have been inter-linked, via the evo-
lution of American and Turkish assessments of Iraq and the Caspian region. It 
shows that, contrary to initial expectations, the occupation of Iraq bolstered the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project as well as a number of other increasingly significant 
natural gas export pipelines.
The March 2003 invasion of Iraq has been inextricably linked with that country’s 
oil reserves, estimated to be the world’s third largest after those of neighboring Saudi 
Arabia and Iran.1 It has been suggested, for example, that Iraq, under the influence of 
US-led occupation, would actively undermine OPEC’s collective market power, serve 
growing US consumer demand for imported petroleum as well as corporate need for 
new investment opportunities, and even manipulate the flow of oil to China.2 American 
officials did little to dispel suspicions about US motives. As Baghdad fell, Vice Presi-
dent Dick Cheney claimed that Iraqi oil production could reach 3 million barrels per 
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day by the year’s end, while Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told the US 
House Appropriations Committee that “[t]he oil revenues of that country could bring 
between $50 billion and $100 billion over the course of the next two or three years.”3 
Given these assumptions of Iraq’s oil prowess, doubts about Caspian energy re-
surfaced. More specifically, would Iraqi oil obviate the need to transport higher-cost 
sources from landlocked Azerbaijan (and possibly Kazakhstan) to world markets via 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline reaching Turkey’s Mediterranean coast? In-
deed, as participants at a post-invasion conference on Caspian oil and gas in Istanbul 
expressed, “the prospect of expanded access to Iraqi energy reserves could cause inves-
tors to reconsider relatively expensive Caspian off-shore projects and the construction 
of the lengthy BTC route.”4
In reality, just the opposite has transpired. Great expectations for Iraqi oil remain 
slow to materialize, while the BTC pipeline is operational, providing both a valuable al-
ternative outlet for Azerbaijan’s crude oil and a small but significant addition to global 
supplies.5 Although the BTC had registered some progress before the invasion of Iraq, 
prolonged damage to Iraq’s oil infrastructure under the occupation and the effects of 
disrepair and sabotage, albeit marginal, on world energy markets virtually guaranteed 
the economic viability not only of the BTC pipeline, but also of its twin Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum (BTE) or South Caucasus gas pipeline, which also conveys Azerbaijan’s gas 
to Turkey. The seller’s market has even brought the Nabucco pipeline, a vastly more 
complex undertaking to transport Caspian and Middle Eastern natural gas supplies to 
Europe through Turkey, into the realm of the feasible. These accomplishments seem 
remarkable in light of the fact that the seminal BTC pipeline was nearly shelved after 
the price collapse in 1998 and the downgrading of Azerbaijan’s offshore oil-reserve 
estimates.
Initial US support for BTC was primarily political rather than financial. Despite 
favorable rhetoric from members of the Clinton Administration, the American govern-
ment remained largely noncommittal towards funding the BTC, even as a means of 
breaking Russian control over the Caucasus transport corridor. Rather, Washington did 
more to back the project by maintaining its ban on the building of new pipelines from 
and through Iran. The occupation of Iraq inadvertently imparted a new momentum to 
Caspian projects like the BTC and BTE by helping to ratchet up world energy prices. 
The aforementioned conditions also fed Turkey’s interest in completing these 
projects. Prolonged constraints on Iraqi oil production and exports through the Iraq-
Turkey (IT) crude oil pipeline, combined with elevated world oil demand, not only 
improved the commercial rationale of the BTC and BTE pipelines, but also dampened 
Ankara’s initial expectations that Turkey might obtain higher oil transit revenues and 
3. Jeff Gerth, “Report Offered Bleak Outlook About Iraq Oil,” The New York Times, October 5, 
2003.
4. Ariel Cohen, “Istanbul Conference: Quiet Concern Over Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline’s Fate,” 
June 2, 2003, http://www.eurasia.org/departments/business/articles/eav060203.shtml.
5. In 2007, its first full year of operation, the BTC pipeline transported four-fifths of Azerbaijan’s 
total oil exports and two-thirds of its output: “the largest contributor to non-OPEC supply growth in 
2006 and 2007,” as noted in USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Azerbaijan, November 2007, http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu.cabs/Azerbaijan/Full.html. See also BOTAS, “Crude Oil Transportation Ac-
tivities and Facilities,” http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/activities/crudeoil.asp. 
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other economic benefits from restored trade with Iraq. Moreover, as compared to the IT 
pipeline, which began its tentative return to pre-invasion operational capacity only in 
the latter part of 2007, the siting and design of the BTC and BTE projects consciously 
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The next section focuses on the major obstacles that Caspian energy, primarily 
the BTC project, faced. The third section addresses factors that aided the success of this 
project, including America’s Middle East policy, specifically towards Iraq and Iran. The 
fourth section examines how the US-led occupation of Iraq reshaped Turkey’s energy 
transport policies. The fifth section broadens the scope of analysis to include natural 
gas, with a discussion of the links between the war in Iraq and Turkish, European, and 
American pipeline policies in both the Middle East and Caspian regions. The final sec-
tion provides concluding remarks. 
OBSTACLES TO CASPIAN OIL EXPORTS
First propounded by Bill Clinton and continued under the George W. Bush Admin-
istration, the US government’s professed aim of consolidating democracy and market 
economies in the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) featured a salient focus 
on developing the hydrocarbon production and export capacities of the non-Russian 
FSU part of the Caspian Sea region. Administration officials knew that Russia’s esti-
mated 148 billion barrels of potential oil reserves were one-third larger than those of 
the other FSU Caspian countries and that Russia had nearly nine times as much gas.6 
Nonetheless, greater perceived opportunities for foreign companies to gain access to the 
non-OPEC hydrocarbon deposits of Azerbaijan (Baku), Kazakhstan (Astana), and Turk-
menistan (Ashgabat) and to build new export infrastructure through Georgia (Tbilisi), 
Turkey (Ankara), and Ukraine (Kiev), thus creating new export routes and revenues free 
from Moscow’s control, made the Caspian integral to Clinton’s vision.7 In ranking his 
administration’s pipeline aid criteria, Jan Kalicki mentioned the Caspian states’ “inde-
pendence, sovereignty and prosperity,” “democratic and free-market development,” and 
“regional cooperation and conflict resolution” prior to citing diversified energy sources 
and assistance for US commercial pursuits.8 This lent itself to the perception that Wash-
ington was using commercial interests to realize geopolitical objectives.9
The United States’ advocacy of ‘multiple pipelines’ primarily targeted Moscow’s 
jurisdictional dominance over the egress of Caspian energy supplies. Even in the 
1990s, when energy markets were relatively soft, Russia constituted a difficult place 
to invest — to a lesser extent in terms of exploration and production (E&P), but to a 
larger extent in relation to building new pipelines independent not only of Gazprom, 
the state-run producer of most Russian gas and the monopoly operator of trans-Russian 
pipelines, but also of Transneft, the sole government-owned oil pipeline operator. This 
leverage has permitted Moscow to use pipeline export quotas as a means of coercing 
6. Jan Kalicki, “Caspian Energy at the Crossroads,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5 (September/
October 2001), p. 123.
7. Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region,” Interna-
tional Studies Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 3 (August 2002), p. 311.
8. Jan Kalicki, “U.S. Policy in the Caspian: Pipelines, Partnership and Prosperity,” Middle East 
Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2 (October 1998), pp. 146-147.
9. Julia Nanay, “The U.S. in the Caspian: The Divergence of Political and Commercial Interests,”
Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2 (October 1998), p. 156; David L. Goldwyn, Martha Brill Olcott, 
Julia Nanay, and Thomas Stauffer, “Symposium: The Caspian Region and the New Great Powers,” 
Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 2000), p. 12.
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private companies to pay their debts or sell off assets.10 Indeed, the plans of the do-
mestic private firm Yukos to build private pipelines to export oil to the United States 
and China may have precipitated the October 2003 arrest of company head Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky (allegedly for non-payment of back taxes), followed by Yukos’ sale to 
Gazprom’s oil subsidiary Rosneft and the rescinding of American firms’ exploration 
rights to an offshore Sakhalin Island oilfield.11
Yet, it was precisely Moscow’s control over access to the Russian upstream sec-
tor and FSU export routes that counseled prudence on the part of US policymakers in 
carrying out the ‘multiple pipelines’ policy. As David Goldwyn, then an energy official 
with the Clinton Administration, remarked in 2000, “We want Russia to resume its 
role as an oil power because it’s important for supply, for Russia’s democracy and for 
its development.”12 Washington backed the building of a 1,600-kilometer (km) pipe-
line (not majority controlled by Transneft, but still traversing Russian territory) that 
started transporting oil from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field to Russia’s Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk in 2001. This support was partially rooted in the fact that the American 
firms Chevron and ExxonMobil owned nearly a combined one-quarter of the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium (CPC) as well as three-quarters of the Tengiz oil stock that feeds 
the CPC pipeline (which also began receiving oil from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak 
field, one-fifth owned by Chevron as well).13 Moreover, even after the case against Yu-
kos’ chairman had gotten underway and Chevron and ExxonMobil had lost the rights 
to explore for Sakhalin Island oil, the latter were seeking to access Russia’s Shtokman 
field and export its liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the United States, a project then be-
ing considered for financial assistance from the US Export-Import Bank and Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation.14 
Until 2002, when this ban was fully waived as a reward for Baku’s counter-ter-
rorism efforts, Washington even maintained economic sanctions on Azerbaijan for its 
blockade of the Armenian territories of Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh. This policy, 
together with the US sanctions against Iran, forced Caspian hydrocarbon producers into 
10. “New rules cause trouble to Russian oil companies,” Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections 
(AGOC), August 31, 1998, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr83607.htm.
11. Alex Rodriguez, “Moscow’s interest in US-Russian oil partnership is fading fast,” AGOC, 
March 25, 2004, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr41206.htm; Marshall Goldman, “Putin and 
the Oligarchs,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6 (November/December 2004). 
12. Goldwyn et al, “Symposium,” p. 4.
13. Transneft’s share is roughly one-quarter as well, and the Kremlin’s control over this consor-
tium partner played a role in pressuring the CPC to accept a 25% transit tariff hike in late 2007 and 
to agree to send incremental volumes of oil through the Bourgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline (a joint 
venture of the Italian company ENI and Transneft to build a Bosporus bypass route), in exchange for 
assenting to expand the CPC pipeline. See Vladimir Socor, “Western Majors Sign Agreement on In-
tent on Trans-Caspian Oil Transport System,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 25, 2007, http://www.
jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371838; USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Kazakhstan, 
February 2008, http://www.eia.doe/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf; “Russia: The Putin Doctrine,” 
Energy Compass, January 4, 2008, http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx. 
14. Kalicki, “U.S. Policy in the Caspian,” p. 148; “US concerned about negative trends in Russia’s 
oil industry,” AGOC, June 29, 2004, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr42699.htm; and “Rus-
sian atmosphere hard for Western companies,” AGOC, October 14, 2004, http://www.gasandoil.com/
goc/company/cnr44173.htm.
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a greater dependence on Russian export routes.15 Only in early 1999, when a lower-
capacity ‘western’ pipeline was completed to transport ‘early’ Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli 
(ACG) oil from Baku and the Georgian port of Supsa, did Azerbaijan obtain an alterna-
tive to the ‘northern’ pipeline between Baku and Novorossiysk, which was vulnerable 
to sabotage and oil theft along its Chechnyan section as well as chronic disputes over 
the division of transit fees between Chechnya and Russia.16 
By the early 21st century, Caspian energy projects could hardly survive on geopolit-
ical credentials alone. Economic conditions were inauspicious: getting offshore Caspian 
oil to Western markets was estimated to require a price threshold of at least $10 per bar-
rel,17 which had collapsed briefly when OPEC’s output hike coincided with a slackening 
in Asian demand. More specifically, the BTC project had its own intrinsic problems. One 
consisted of disputes over transit fees and financial guarantees pitting Baku and the Brit-
ish Petroleum (BP)-led 12-company Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC) 
against Ankara. Another problem ensued from a series of unsuccessful drillings, which 
led AIOC to downgrade estimates of offshore ACG oil reserves (the main feeder source 
for the BTC pipeline) to 3 billion barrels, half of what had been assessed earlier as nec-
essary to justify BTC’s fixed costs, and postpone estimated maximum oil production of 
800,000 barrels until 2007, two years after the project’s planned completion.18 
Therefore, it was expected that the BTC’s viability would depend to a greater extent 
on obtaining Kazakhstan’s oil. It was envisaged that the extant BTC line, crossing nearly 
1,800 km from the Caspian’s western littoral to the Mediterranean, would be extended an-
other one-third of that distance eastwards to reach Aktau on Kazakhstan’s coast, forming 
a longer ABTC energy corridor. Exacerbating the already difficult topography of the BTC 
route, a trans-Caspian subsea pipeline would add further geological risks.19 Moreover, the 
Caspian Sea’s own geopolitical contours, incorporating the territorial presence of Russia 
15. Goldwyn et al, “Consortium,” pp. 4, 6; and Baghat, “Pipeline Diplomacy,” pp. 321-322.
16. “Azeri oil arriving in Novorosiisk,” AGOC, December 8, 1997, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/
news/ntr75049.htm; “First ‘early Caspian oil’ in tanker at Supsa to European markets,” AGOC, May 11, 
1999, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr92002.htm; USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Azerbaijan; 
Jennifer DeLay, “Shutdown of Baku-Novorosiisk shows Russia has a lot of work to do on pipeline secu-
rity,” AGOC, August 6, 1999, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr93274.htm; and “Headaches for 
Russian oil export,” AGOC, September 8, 1999, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr93784.htm.
17. Amy Meyers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Myth of the Caspian ‘Great Game’: The 
Real Geopolitics of Energy,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998-99), p. 118; and Fadhil J. Chalabi, 
“Gulf Oil vs. the Oil of the Caspian Sea,” in The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 
Caspian Energy Resources: Implications for the Arab Gulf (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research, 2000), p. 162.
18. “Baku-Ceyhan pipeline needs to be cheaper to be attractive,” AGOC, December 24, 1998, 
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc85246.htm; Jennifer DeLay, “Azerbaijani, Turkish working 
groups butt heads over Baku-Ceyhan costs and tariffs,” AGOC, September 22, 1999, http://www.gas-
andoil.com/goc/news/ntc93973.htm; and Charles Coe, “Questions still hover over pipeline projects 
following Richardson’s Caspian tour,” AGOC, October 15, 1999, http://gasandoil.com/goc.news/
ntc94208.htm. As of late 2007, maximum Azeri oil output was forecast to reach 1.3 million daily 
barrels by 2010, most of which would come from the feeder source for the BTC pipeline, as noted in 
USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Azerbaijan.
19. On Caspian Sea geology, see Philip D. Rabinowitz, Mehdi Z. Yusifov, Jessica Arnoldi, and 
Eyal Hakim, “Geology, Oil and Gas Potential, Pipelines, and the Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Regi-
on,” Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 35 (2004), pp. 19-40, especially pp. 31-33.
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and Iran as littoral states, have been as daunting as the myriad separatist conflicts afflict-
ing the trans-Caucasus and Turkish legs of the BTC project. The latter states maintain a 
common opposition to deeper US inroads into the basin region.20 However, Moscow did 
agree with Astana in 1998 and Baku in 2001 to demarcate national offshore sectors based 
on partitioning the seabed equidistant to opposite shores, while Tehran has long favored 
either a ‘condominium approach’ (joint management) or an equal five-way division of the 
surface area and seabed resources.21 Iran even used military force to destroy Azerbaijan’s 
boundary-demarcation buoys in the 1990s and to halt BP’s exploratory drilling in a dis-
puted block in July 2001.22 Moreover, the aforementioned CPC undertaking would lessen 
the necessity for an ABTC pipeline. Consequently, plans for an ABTC route have been 
limited to increasing tanker shipments of Kazakh oil.23 
MULTIPLE LIFELINES FOR CASPIAN OIL
Renewed interest in the Caspian, notably the BTC, had several direct sources. En-
ergy prices already had begun firming up upon the post-1999 resumption of rising Chi-
nese oil consumption (which increased by half over 1999-2004, accounting for nearly 
one-third of the global increase) and crude oil imports (which increased more than 
six-fold between 1998, when they provided 6% of Chinese supply, and 2004, when 
they hit 30%).24 The BTC pipeline also was aided by favorable developments particular 
to the project itself. These included such fortuitous events as the 1999 discovery that 
Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz field held large gas deposits, which started to reach 
Turkey in 2007 via the South Caucasus Pipeline running parallel to the BTC; AIOC’s 
upward revision of estimated ACG oil reserves to 5.3 billion barrels, above the break-
even point; and post-1999 cooperation among Baku, Tbilisi, Ankara, the Main Export 
Pipeline (MEP) company (which includes the AIOC), and various outside financiers on 
tariff levels, transit-revenue allocations, and pipeline-cost defrayments.25
Notwithstanding its ‘multiple pipelines’ policy, the US government’s role in up-
20. Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy,” p. 318. 
21. Gawdat Bahgat, “Energy Security: The Caspian Sea,” Minerals & Energy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2005), 
pp. 3-15, especially pp. 6-8.
22. Rabinowitz et al, “Geology, Oil, and Gas Pipelines, and the Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Regi-
on,” pp. 31-32; Robert M. Cutler, “Renewed conflicts in the Caspian: Part 1,” AGOC, September 11, 2001, 
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc13757.htm; and “Flare-up of tension between Tehran and Baku is 
not only about oil,” AGOC, September 25, 2001, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc13971.htm.
23. This is indicated by AIOC’s 2006 announcement of plans to reduce the amount of its oil (from the 
ACG reserves) to 60% of the BTC pipeline’s throughput. See USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Azerbaijan.
24. Paul A. Williams, “Projections for the geopolitical economy of oil after war in Iraq,” Futures, 
Vol. 38, No. 9 (November 2006), p. 1080. Chinese import statistics are derived from data contained in 
various issues of the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Oil Market Report, http://omrpublic.iea.org. 
25. Robert M. Cutler, “Just when you thought Baku-Ceyhan was dead and buried: Part I,” AGOC, 
December 24, 1999, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc95244.htm; Robert M. Cutler, “Just 
when you thought Baku-Ceyhan was dead and buried: Part 6,” AGOC, May 12, 2000, http://www.
gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc01943.htm; Robert M. Cuter, “Just when you thought Baku-Ceyhan was 
dead and buried: Part 7, conclusion,” AGOC, May 26, 2000, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/
ntc02156.htm; and “Financiers and investors line up behind the BTC project,” AGOC, June 27, 2002, 
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc22653.htm. 
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grading Caspian energy output and export prospects was more indirect. A constant de-
gree of interest in non-Russian FSU projects relates to Washington’s bans on US and 
other financing of Iranian energy projects. A natural lure for foreign investment, Iran has 
a pipeline network that can be extended from its Caspian shore to the Strait of Hormuz, 
potentially undercutting the economic rationale for trans-Turkish routes, and 9 and 13% 
of global oil and natural gas reserves, respectively (in 1995).26 However, since 1995, 
US firms have been barred from investing in Iranian energy projects and Congress’ 
1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA, amended in 2006 to the Iran Sanctions Act, valid 
through 2011) has sanctioned foreign investment in Iran of over $20 million per year.27 
While US firms were denied licenses to ‘swap’ Caspian Sea oil with Iran, the ILSA was 
waived in accordance with the Clinton Administration’s May 1998 approval of a French-
Russian-Malaysian project to develop the South Pars gas field, so US companies felt 
disadvantaged against foreign firms.28 While US companies seemed to be stalling on the 
BTC project in anticipation of the expiry of sanctions on Iran, prohibitions on Iranian 
pipeline investment held firm.29 Moreover, during 1997-2002, while OPEC exports de-
creased 7%, Iran’s fell by one-fifth, and the seller’s market of 2002-2006, during which 
OPEC exports rose by one-quarter, boosted Iranian volumes by only 12%.30 
Post-9/11 support for democratization, counter-terrorism, and weapons non-pro-
liferation within the scope of President Bush’s ‘Greater Middle East Project’ finally 
ended prohibitions on US aid to Azerbaijan. Conversely, this campaign, by furnishing a 
new rationale for efforts to unseat Saddam Husayn in Iraq, foreshadowed a lowering of 
oil prices that threatened the commercial viability of non-Russian FSU energy projects. 
Inadvertently, however, the occupation of Iraq boosted Caspian energy plans, helping 
to raise prices and Turkey’s interest in hosting alternative energy transit routes, by incit-
ing a sabotage campaign against that country’s oil infrastructure, already dilapidated 
from decades of warfare and UN sanctions.
Iraq had been under UN Security Council sanctions since the end of the 1990-
26. Goldwyn et al, “Symposium,” p. 14; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006, pp. 17-20, http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistica
l%20Bulletin/pdf/ASB2006.pdf. Iran was estimated to possess over 11 and 15%, respectively, of the 
world’s total oil and gas reserves in 2006, according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 
2007, pp. 6 and 22.
27. Kalicki, “Caspian Energy,” pp. 126-127; and Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Pol-
icy Responses (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), pp. 46-49, http://fpc.state.
gov/documents/organization/91002.pdf.
28. Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, p. 47; House of Representatives, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Re-
lations, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, June 25, 2003, Enforcement of the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act and Increasing Security Threats from Iran (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 2003); and Fiona Hill, “Pipelines in the Caspian: Catalyst or Cure-all?” Georgetown Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter/Spring 2004), pp. 19, 21. 
29. Robert M. Cutler, “Just when you thought Baku-Ceyhan was dead and buried IV,” AGOC, 
March 9, 1999, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc.news/ntc01087.htm. Small volumes of oil from Rus-
sia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan are tankered to Iran’s Caspian port of Neka and then ‘swapped’ for 
equivalent volumes shipped from the Gulf. See USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Iran, October 2007, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html.
30. OPEC, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, p. 31; and House of Representatives, Enforcement of 
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Increasing Security Threats from Iran, pp. 23-28. 
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1991 Gulf War. During November 1998-2002, however, the Ba‘thist regime had ex-
pelled weapons inspection teams then monitoring imports of dual-use technology un-
der the 1996-2003 Oil-for-Food program, which permitted Iraq to spend oil revenue 
on necessities in return for submitting these purchases to inspection and pre-approval 
within the scope of the weapons monitoring effort.31 In this context, the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, 
DC furnished a rationale for the Bush Administration to brand Iraq as part of an “axis 
of evil” backing terrorism and WMD acquisition and to seek Security Council approval 
for military intervention later that fall. Secondarily, these events incited a comparison 
by some think tank scholars of the costs of exporting Iraqi and Azeri crude oil and 
speculation as to whether the start of BTC pipeline construction had been deliberately 
moved up to September 2002.32
Iraq’s energy reserves fueled optimism regarding the country’s post-invasion oil 
production, export, and revenue potential. While the 1972 nationalization of the Iraq Pe-
troleum Company rendered methods of estimating proven oil reserves opaque and corre-
sponding estimates uncertain, even after deducting the 1928-2002 cumulative production 
of nearly 29 billion barrels, Iraq’s actual reserves remained large (at least 78 billion bar-
rels), its production costs low, its territory sparsely explored, only one-fifth of its fields in 
operation, and only one-quarter of over 500 prospective sites ever drilled, with only 6% 
of drilled sites developed.33 This propitious combination raised hopes that regime change 
could improve the investment climate and raise output to six million daily barrels.34 
However, decades of mismanagement, accumulated debt, war, and sanctions raised 
the risk of further invasion-related damage to Iraq’s oil industry. During the 1980-1988 
31. Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade (Wash-
ington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003), p. 3, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30472.pdf.
32. Bulent Aliriza, as cited in Xinhua, “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is key to US oil policy,” 
AGOC, November 13, 2002, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc24643.htm; and Andreas And-
rianopoulos, “The Economics and Politics of Caspian Oil,” Journal of Southeast European & Black 
Sea Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2003), p. 80. Also see footnote 4. In fact, the schedule laid out 
in the October 2000 Turnkey Agreement between BTC Sponsor Group (MEP Company) and BOTAS, 
Turkey’s state oil pipeline operator and directorate for BTC’s Turkish section, implies that the 32-
month construction phase began two months late, after the July 2002 completion of a 12-month deta-
iled engineering phase. See BOTAS, “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan COPL Project Directorate,” http://www.
btc.com.tr/eng/project.html and http://www.btc.com.tr/eng/chronoloji.html. 
33. Gal Luft, “How Much Oil Does Iraq Have?” Iraq Memo #16, May 12, 2003, http://www.brook-
ings.edu/papers/2003/0512globalenvironment_luft.aspx; Council of Foreign Relations and James A. 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University (Baker Institute Report), Guiding Principles 
for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq (January 2003), http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attach-
ments/Post-War_Iraq.pdf, p. 19; USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Iraq; and OPEC, OPEC Annual 
Statistical Bulletin 2006, p. 54.
34. Neil Ford, “Iraq: The Crucial Dimension,” The Middle East, No. 334 (May 2003), pp. 42-45; and 
Fadhil Chalabi, “Iraq and the Future of World Oil,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 2000), 
p. 166. According to the Baker Report, Iraq had a pre-invasion oil production capacity of “between 
2.6 and 2.8 million barrels per day.” Baker Institute Report, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Pol-
icy in Iraq; OPEC, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006, p. 11. However, over the course of 2002, Iraq 
was producing on average only 2.0 or 2.1 bpd. USEIA, Annual Energy Review 2006, p. 309. In January 
and February of 2003, Iraq’s average daily output increased to 2.5 million bpd. IEA, Oil Market Report, 
April 10, 2003, p. 57 and IEA, Oil Market Report, May 13, 2003, p. 55.
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Iran-Iraq War, the oil terminals and tankers in the Persian Gulf suffered heavy damage 
and Iraq’s export pipeline through Syria was closed. Iraqi oil production was capped 
below 1.5 million daily barrels and the bulk of its commensurably reduced exports mid-
decade were funneled through the Iraq-Turkey (IT) pipeline to Ceyhan (the capacity of 
which was augmented in 1984 and again 1987, with the addition of a parallel line).35 The 
Gulf War destroyed a larger swath of the national energy infrastructure, reducing Iraq’s 
southern oil industry to a small fraction of its former capacity in mid-1991, with subse-
quent UN sanctions shutting down its export pipelines altogether.
The Oil-for-Food program afforded Iraq the opportunity to restore oil output on 
a sustainable basis. Iraq earned $65 billion in revenue from legal oil sales, but was esti-
mated during 1997-2002 to have earned at least $4 billion (but perhaps upwards of $21 
billion) from illicit exports though Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf.36 As the 
2000-2002 period marked Iraq’s brief respite from war, OPEC quotas, or full sanctions, 
average annual output and exports correspondingly rose by around one-fifth over that 
three-year period relative to the first half of Oil-for-Food, while Iraq’s average annual 
revenue (peaking at nearly $20 billion for 2000) nearly doubled.37 Revenue was probably 
misused, as evidenced by such practices as prolonged overpumping prior to the March 
2003 war as well as the reinjection of refined oil and unchecked water intrusion into 
crude reservoirs, all of which degraded the quality of Iraq’s higher quality crude blend 
from Kirkuk and lowered recovery rates there to 9% and to 15-25% in the south.38 
Thus, based partially on the same UN reports of the ‘lamentable’ state of Iraq’s oil 
industry that led to the 1998-2000 relaxation of oil revenue ceilings, informed observ-
ers were inclined to downplay expectations of a bonanza based on “wishful thinking 
... that [Iraqi] oil revenues will help defray war costs and the expense of rebuilding the 
Iraqi state and economy.”39 The Baker Institute Working Group, for example, estimated 
that restoring and developing Iraq’s well infrastructure would cost $30-40 billion, and 
that Iraq, having experienced steady yearly output declines before the 2003 conflict, 
would need 18-36 months as well as $5 billion initially and $3 billion in subsequent 
annual operating expenses to repair existing export installations and restore output to 
its annual pre-1990 peak of 3.5 million daily barrels.40 
During the March-April 2003 offensive, US-led coalition forces minimized new 
battle damage to Iraqi oil infrastructure. With Iraqi forces having destroyed roughly 
700 wells before their 1991 retreat from Kuwait and possibly mining wells in northern 
Iraq, US forces, mindful of a similar possibility, acted to secure all but seven of Iraq’s 
1,500 wells and repair teams quickly extinguished any remaining fires. However, in-
35. Iraq-Turkey Pipeline export percentages are derived by comparing Iraq’s overall export vol-
umes found in OPEC, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006, p. 31, with Kirkuk-Ceyhan export 
quantities compiled by BOTAS and reproduced in Table 7.23 of Turkey, State Planning Organization 
(DPT), “Economic and Social Indicators,” http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/esg/esg-i.html.
36. UN Office of the Iraq Program (UNOIP), “Oil Exports (By Phase),” http://www.un.org/Depts/
oip/background/basicfigures.html; Katzman, Iraq, pp. 12-14; and Judith Miller, “The Oil-for-Food 
Program: Panel Pegs Illicit Iraq Earnings at $21.3 Billion,” The New York Times, November 16, 2004.
37. OPEC, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006, pp. 13, 21, and 31. 
38. USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Iraq, March 2004, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu.cabs/iraq.htm. 
39. Baker Institute Report, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq, p. 10.
40. Baker Institute Report, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq, pp. 10-13, 16, 
19-22.
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surrectionist looting and sabotage — the first waves of resistance at the beginning of 
the occupation — targeting the country’s vast pipeline network and power grid caused 
almost four-fifths of total infrastructure damage.41 Iraqi oil pipelines, installations, and 
personnel were attacked nearly three dozen times in 2003, with this count quadrupling 
and reaching its annual peak in 2004 (yearly attacks fell to 79 in 2007).42 Consequently, 
while Iraq earned $5 billion in June-December 2003 ($8.6 billion for the entire year) 
and another $16 billion by December 2004, thus benefiting in part from $30-40 per 
barrel prices helped by its lower exports (Iraqi instability may have added a $10 per 
barrel ‘security premium’), it suffered respective average output and export shortfalls 
of almost 900,000 and 450,000 daily barrels compared to pre-war estimates, as well as 
$7-21 billion in cumulative revenue losses during 2003-2004.43 




1997 718 1,008 1,166
1998 768 1,088 2,121
1999 910 1,244 2,610
2000 1,026 1,347 2,614
2001 1,147 1,480 2,523
2002 1,329 1,582 2,116
2003 1,424 1,792 1,344
2004 1,612 1,957 2,030
2005 1,808 2,126 1,833
2006 2,080 2,368 1,999
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data found in British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 2007, p. 8.
Note: Non-Russian FSU Caspian production figures include Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan.
TURKEY, IRAQ, AND PIPELINE CONNECTIONS
Ankara’s interest in an alternative energy transportation route already had become 
increasingly salient due to post-Cold War increases in ‘free’ oil transit through Turkey’s 
41. USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Iraq, March 2004; and Williams, “Projections for the geopo-
litical economy of oil after war in Iraq,” p. 1078.
42. Pipeline attacks are tabulated by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pi-
peline Watch,” http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm; The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Trac-
king Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex.
43. Calculations are derived from UNOIP, “Oil Exports;” The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index; 
and Milan Vesely, “Iraq’s Oil Wealth Fuel Fires of Discontent,” The Middle East, No. 351 (December 
2004), pp. 26-27. On the ‘security premium’ factored into oil prices, see John Roberts, “The Cost of 
Iraq Oil,” http://platts.com/Oil/Resources/News%20Features/iraq/costs.htm. 
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narrow Bosphorus Straits as well as post-Gulf War cuts in Iraqi oil supplies and tariff 
revenue. Until the BTC commenced operation, the vast share of oil exported from 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia was reaching the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk 
and later Supsa to converge on the Bosphorus. Several thousand oil tankers, most de-
parting from Russian territory, now carry a daily average of 2.4 million barrels (down 
from over three million barrels). With Turkey having experienced accidents resulting 
in oil spills in 1994 and 1999, the latter coating 10 km of shoreline in the environs of 
Istanbul, Ankara began taking measures that arguably exceeded its rights under the 
1936 Montreux Convention, such as requiring tanker operators to use local pilots and 
banning nighttime transit for ships over a certain length. Augmented and increasingly 
regulated Bosphorus traffic has effectively lengthened ‘demurrage’ or delays, charges 
for which consume up to one-third of the price of transported oil.44 
Turkey’s preference for the BTC was further reinforced by losses of transit rev-
enues and oil imports due to post-1990 shutdowns of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline. This pipe-
line bringing oil from Kirkuk to Ceyhan has not worked continuously since its inception 
in 1977, with the longest interruption spanning August 1990-December 1996. Prior to 
the imposition of UN sanctions, it pumped at its maximum in the 1980s, reaching a peak 
average of 1.5 million daily barrels from 1987 (after the second line was completed) until 
August 1990. Moreover, in these respective periods, Turkey diverted a fraction of this 
throughput to its own refineries, representing at least 30% of its total crude oil imports.45 
Under the aegis of UN sanctions, however, Ankara closed the IT pipeline and 
stopped trading with Iraq. Revenue from pipeline oil shipments, transit of other goods 
to Europe, construction contracts, and worker remittances were severed, Iraqi debt re-
payment suspended, tourism receipts dropped, and oil prices soared due to the four 
million barrel per day shortage of supplies (including Kuwait’s).46 Ankara obtained 
compensation in the form of arms, security assistance (PKK attacks accelerated after 
the end of the Iran-Iraq War), higher US textile import quotas, and concessionary oil 
supplies from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.47 Moreover, UN 
Resolution 986 mandated the use of IT as a conduit for “the larger share” of Iraq’s oil 
exports (the normal situation prior to the Gulf War, but characterizing only one year 
after 1990, which was 1998) and allowed Iraq to exceed its oil revenue ceiling to IT tar-
iff costs for the first three semi-annual phases of Oil-for-Food, while illicit truckborne 
44. “Georgian border breached by pipeline,” AGOC, February 2, 1999, http://www.gasandoil.com/
goc/news/ntc90660.htm; “Turkey intends to improve navigational safety of Turkish straits,” AGOC, 
March 3, 1999, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc91076.htm; “Bosphorus bottleneck compli-
cates exports of Caspian oil,” AGOC, June 29, 2004, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc42617.
htm; “Russia seeks alternative to Turkish straits,” AGOC, September 1, 2004, http://www.gasandoil.
com/goc/news/ntc43555.htm; USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: World Oil Transit Chokepoints, Janu-
ary 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.html; USEIA, Country Analysis Brief: Turkey, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html.
45. Derived from DPT and Table 2 in Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1991), p. 102. 
46. Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 
36-37; and USEIA, Iraq Energy Chronology: 1980-February 2004, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
cabs/iraqchron.html.
47. Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West,” pp. 37-38.
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shipments to Turkey were condoned.48 Yet these measures failed to help Turkey recover 
an estimated $40 billion of income lost by 2002 from trade restrictions. 
In the wake of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, grounds for pessimism about 
jump-starting Iraq’s oil industry, especially in terms of restoring IT flow to its pre-1990 
heyday, renewed optimism for BTC’s prospects. The war brought about a virtual halt 
to Kirkuk-Ceyhan exports after June 2003, when the IT pipeline was first attacked by 
Iraqi insurrectionists, whose acts of sabotage, compounding the effects of already poor 
maintenance originating prior to the invasion, helped to suppress pipeline operations 
to no more than 100,000 barrels per day on average over the 2004-2007 period (in 
2005-2006, the line was pumping no more than 36,000 daily barrels on average). This 
de facto re-closure limited average Iraqi oil exports to 400,000 daily barrels for 2003 
(compared to 1.6 million daily barrels in the last three months leading up to the war) 
and to less than 1.5 million daily barrels for 2004-2006.49 It also has underscored what 
BOTAS, Turkey’s state oil pipeline operator, has emphasized as the benefits Turkey can 
expect to receive from the BTC: $150-300 million per year in “transit fees and opera-
tions service payments;” lower costs of transporting oil to Turkish refineries (in terms 
of a 13-day reduction in transit time vis-à-vis oil arriving from the Persian Gulf); and 
an ability to purchase 30-40% of the transported oil.50 Only in early 2008, after some 
improvement in security impinging on IT pipeline operations, was Kirkuk oil again 
reaching Ceyhan at pre-invasion rates; but by then, the BTC pipeline was transporting 
nearly twice as much oil.51 
ThE IRAQ WAR, ThE CASPIAN REGION, TURKEY, AND EUROPE
As we argued above, contrary to the initial expectations, the war in Iraq gave an 
unforeseen boost to the financial and political fortunes of projects to export Caspian 
oil to global markets. These projects encompass natural gas as well. Just as the extrac-
tion of larger volumes of Caspian oil and gas became more economically feasible in 
a seller’s market, so did the pipelines to export them. If the building of the seminal 
BTC pipeline seemed far-fetched in the 1990s, many additional projects have either 
been completed (e.g., the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and the Turkey-Greece leg of a larger 
planned Turkey-Greece-Italy Internconnector) or are under active consideration (e.g., 
Nabucco and the Trans-Caspian pipelines).52 
Indeed, as instability in the Middle East dragged on, major energy consuming 
countries began to pay more attention to the Caspian basin. Among them, European 
nations have had more reason — namely, uncertainty regarding Russian control of 
48. Katzman, Iraq, pp. 2, 7, and 14.
49. BOTAS, “Crude Oil Transportation Activities and Facilities;” UNOIP, “Weekly Oil Exports 
under the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme,” http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background.oilex-
ports.html; and OPEC, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006, p. 31.
50. BOTAS, “Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi COPL Project Directorate.”
51. BOTAS, “Crude Oil Transportation Activities and Facilities.”
52. For more information on these projects, see Ali Tekin and Paul Williams, “Europe’s External 
Energy Policy and Turkey’s Accession Process,” Europe-Asia Studies, forthcoming, as well as Ali 
Tekin and Paul Williams, “Turkey and EU Energy Security: The Pipeline Connection,” East European 
Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 2008). 
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major sources of natural gas — than other actors to prioritize access to the Caspian’s 
energy resources. Although companies from Europe have been important players in 
the region’s energy sector, the EU and its member states have developed strong inter-
est in the Caspian only in recent years. The EU has labelled the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnector and Nabucco pipelines as “Trans European Networks-Energy priority 
projects” because it considers these projects significant steps in ensuring the transit of 
energy resources and the increased security of supply in Europe .53
A particularly important means for Europe to reach Caspian energy resources is 
the Nabucco Pipeline Project, construction of which is expected to start in 2009. The 
project will have the capacity to convey assorted Caspian and Middle Eastern sources 
of natural gas, amounting to yearly volumes of up to 30 billion cubic meters, across 
Turkey to Europe, where Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria, and possibly France 
will transport or consume a share of the piped gas.54 The project has run into diffi-
culties, as state-owned Hungarian and Austrian member companies of the Nabucco 
Consortium agreed with Gazprom to undertake rival joint ventures in transportation 
and storage projects. In addition, the project may founder on Turkey’s resistance to 
including Gaz de France, whose home country has staunchly opposed the former’s EU 
accession, as a seventh member of the consortium.55 Yet EU diplomacy, including a 
recent visit to Turkey by Commission President Jose Manual Barroso, has been trying 
to ameliorate the situation in the interests of expediting the project.56
Turkey also has emerged as a more central presence in the energy realm. While the 
Iraq War was expected to worsen economic losses for Turkey, it helped the country in un-
expected ways. Other than improvement in the economic feasibility of trans-Turkey pipe-
line routes due to high energy prices, assessments that the Caspian, Central Asia, and Iran 
hold enough gas to supply Europe through Turkey at reasonable costs helped to establish 
Turkey as a natural transit route to Europe. Therefore, coupled with heightened European 
interest in non-Russian sources of gas, which is commmonly transported via pipelines 
(unlike oil), higher energy prices increased Turkey’s strategic value for Europe.57 
Recent events are indicative of these new developments. In June 2007, a high-
level Istanbul conference examined the common challenges and opportunities for the 
EU and Turkey in the energy field. A joint statement of Turkish and Commission lead-
ers called the conference “a milestone in their strategic cooperation in the field of ener-
gy,” emphasizing the importance of strategic cooperation and exploitation of Turkey’s 
geographic location in enhancing energy security for Europe. Firm commitment was 
extended to Nabucco and other projects with the goal of exploiting Turkey’s potential 
53. Commission of the European Communities, “The Community Guidelines for the Development 
of the Trans-European Energy Networks,” Decision 1364/2006. 
54. Tekin and Williams, “Turkey and EU;” and Tekin and Williams, “Europe’s External Energy.” 
55. On these and what this and similar projects imply for Turkey-EU relations, see Tekin and Wil-
liams, “Europe’s External Energy;” and Ali Tekin and Iva Walterova, “Turkey’s New Geopolitics: The 
Energy Angle,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2007). 
56. See for example, Enis Berberoglu, “Barroso’nun gazı var” [“Barroso Has Gas”], hurriyet, 
April 13, 2008.
57. On Turkey-EU relations in general, see Ali Tekin, “Future of Turkey-EU Relations: A Civilisa-
tional Approach,” Futures, Vol. 37, No. 4 (May 2005). On Turkey’s renewed strategic value in general, 
see Tekin and Walterova, “Turkey’s New Geopolitics: The Energy Angle.”
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to become a major energy player.58 
The conference also clearly linked Turkey’s role in European energy security 
with its accession process. After affirming Turkey’s strategic importance for the secu-
rity of energy supplies to the EU, the joint statement declared that, “as Turkey is mov-
ing forward in the accession process, coherent policies will need to be implemented 
with a view to ensuring secure access to the energy resources of the region and their 
safe arrival to the markets.”59 The statement also encouraged Turkey to join the Energy 
Community as soon as possible, “as an equal party in the decision making process.”60 
Generally more supportive of the development of Caspian energy resources and 
their export to Western markets via Turkey (rather than Russia or Iran), American policy 
did not change much after the Iraq War. The US has encouraged EU countries to follow 
more active policies in the region.61 However, Iran remains a crucial point of contention. 
While the EU is generally more sympathetic to the option of bringing more Iranian gas 
to Europe through the Nabucco pipeline, the US remains a vehement opponent. Thus, 
short of major regime change in Iran, the Nabucco project is not likely to include Iran, 
even if this compromises its ability to bring sufficient quantities of gas to Europe. 
CONCLUSION
Like any complicated engineering undertaking that bears the added burden of cross-
ing geologically and politically difficult countries, the BTC pipeline project faced numer-
ous setbacks until it became operational in 2006. Contrary to initial expectations, the war 
in Iraq failed to kill the BTC because it could not unleash a flood of cheap Iraqi oil. In ad-
dition to its having gained considerable endogenous momentum from the last half-decade 
of generally rising oil prices as well as from a number of other unforeseen economic and 
organizational developments, the selection of the BTC was favorably influenced by Azer-
baijan’s and Turkey’s respective security problems affecting the aging Baku-Novorossiysk 
and Kirkuk-Ceyhan lines. The geostrategic calculations of successive US presidents also 
ensured the success of the BTC, less via their ambivalent stance towards trans-Russian 
oil exports than by way of veto over the trans-Iranian route and, even more inadvertently, 
through inadequate provision for the security of Iraq’s oil infrastructure.
Besides boosting the financial and political status of the BTC, the Iraq War also has 
lent a helping hand to other projects connecting Caspian energy supplies with outside 
markets, especially European ones. As instability in the Middle East has continued, en-
ergy prices have soared, reinforcing Russia’s moves to tighten state control over Eurasian 
energy supplies, so the EU and its member states have begun to view the Nabucco project 
as more vital to Europe’s energy security. This project, which has been complicated by 
considerations of whether or not to include Iran, brought together Caspian energy suppli-
ers, Turkey, the EU, and — to a great extent — the US around a broadly consistent com-
mon energy policy regarding the Caspian basin. This has happened, however, not as part 
of a conscious design, but rather as an unanticipated outcome of the war in Iraq.
58. Joint Press Release, Turkey and the EU: Together for a European Energy Policy — High Level 
Conference in Istanbul on June 5, 2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do.
59. Joint Press Release, Turkey and the EU. 
60. Joint Press Release, Turkey and the EU.
61. See David Gow, “US Tells Europe to Stop Dithering Over Pipeline,” The Guardian, February 23, 2008.
